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Adaptive Strategies in Response to the Economic
Crisis: A Cross-Cultural Study
in Austria and Slovenia
Dietmar Sternad
This study builds on prior research on culture-specific diﬀerences in
strategic decision-making and strategic issue analysis, and extends it to
the field of strategic crisis adaptation. Taking an upper echelons per-
spective, it is investigated whether the cultural dimension of uncer-
tainty avoidance had an eﬀect on strategic directions that managers
chose in response to the 2008–2009 global financial and economic cri-
sis. Building on a framework of strategic crisis responses and a quanti-
tative survey conducted among 257 managers in Austria and Slovenia,
the findings suggest that strategic issue interpretations of the economic
crisis as well as country diﬀerences influence whether firms are using
externally versus internally-directed strategic responses, and pro-active
versus retrenchment strategies. The diﬀerences in strategy deployment
between the two countries, however, could not be consistently traced
to diﬀerences in the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance, thus
suggesting that other country-specific factors like institutional or social
diﬀerences also play an important role.
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Introduction
Businesses are influenced by major changes in their environment, those
events and developments external to the organization which consid-
erably and structurally aﬀect (a) the attainability of an organization’s
strategic objectives and/or (b) the strategic choices open to the orga-
nization. The financial crisis of 2008–2009 and the subsequent global
recession constitute a major environmental change with an impact on
a variety of diﬀerent industries and countries at the same time. All eu
countries (with the only exception of Poland) showed a negative real
gdp growth rate in the year 2009 (Eurostat 2010), leading to consider-
able negative demand eﬀects all across the continent, accompanied by
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lower sales revenues, pressure on margins, and a lack of resource avail-
ability. In addition, economic crises lead to rising unemployment, credit
shortage, more price-sensitive customers, increased competitive rivalry
based on price, a significant decline in exports, and a higher level of busi-
ness failures (Pearce and Michael 2006; Bricongne et al. 2011). Although
most businesses are adversely aﬀected by recessions, for management re-
searchers, ‘recessions are a godsend [. . .] they are [. . .] a natural setting in
which to study how firms cope with environmental challenges’ (Geroski
and Gregg 1994, 1). Despite this, Kitching et al. (2009) noticed a gen-
eral lack of research focusing on strategic adaptation to major economic
downturns.
Upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Carpenter, Gelet-
kanycz and Sandres 2004; Hambrick 2007; Rost andOsterloh 2010) posits
that the strategic choices that organizations make – and thus also deci-
sions on how to strategically adapt to major economic crises – are con-
siderably influenced by the characteristics of their top executives, specif-
ically also by their cognitive base and values. These influences can be di-
rect – whenmanagers act upon their individual preferences – or indirect,
when values aﬀect executives’ perceptions which are subsequently shap-
ing managerial action (Hambrick and Brandon 1988). Managers’ cogni-
tive bases and values, in turn, can be influenced by the national cultures
in which they were socialized (Brockner 2003; Dickson, BeShears and
Gupta 2004).
Several authors (for instance Schneider 1989; Haiss 1990; Ross 1999)
support the argument that strategic decision-making can be influenced
by national culture. Barr and Glynn (2004) found that cultural diﬀer-
ences could have an influence on strategy, however, only at the level of
specific cultural dimensions, thereby concluding that strategy research
should take these fine-grained diﬀerences into account. Following this
advice, the aim of this paper is to explore whether the diﬀerence in one
dimension of national culture, uncertainty avoidance, has an influence
on strategic action as the output of the strategic adaptation process when
companies are faced with a major economic crisis.
In an empirical study, it was investigated how managers in two Eu-
ropean countries (Austria and Slovenia) perceived and interpreted the
global financial and economic crisis of the years 2008–2009, and how
their organizations strategically reacted to this external event.
The findings of this paper contribute a cross-cultural perspective to
the literature on strategic adaptation; thereby following Sminia’s (2009)
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call for research that focuses on the links between a firm’s environment
and strategy-making processes, Elbanna’s (2006) demand for more re-
search on the role of national context in strategic decision-making pro-
cesses, and Hambrick’s (2007) urge for more studies on upper echelons
eﬀects in diﬀerent national contexts.
Strategic Adaptation to Environmental Change
An adaptive perspective of the environment-organization relationship
assumes that organizations actively adapt to changes within their envi-
ronment through taking and implementing decisions which are altering
their strategy, structure, and processes (Frishammar 2006).
The term adaptation is so widely used in the strategic and organiza-
tional literature that Starbuck (1965, 468) noted that ‘one could legiti-
mately discuss all the aspects of organizations which are relevant to adap-
tation, which means, in turn, that one could legitimately discuss every-
thing that has been written about organizations.’ It is therefore necessary
to define what is meant by ‘adaptation.’ In Chakravarthy’s (1982) terms,
I take a process perspective on adaptation (rather than investigating the
state of adaptation or adaptive ability of a firm). I base my investiga-
tion on Mintzberg’s (1977) notion that organizations through a stream
of decisions develop a certain pattern to orient themselves towards the
environment. Taking into account the nature of strategic decisions as in-
cluding high resource commitments and aﬀecting the overall scope and
direction of a company, and building on former perspectives on strate-
gic adaptation (e. g. Miles and Snow 1978; Eunni, Post and Berger 2005;
Dervitsiotis 2006), I define strategic adaptation for the purpose of this
study as the process by which management actively aligns an organiza-
tion to a changing environment through setting actions which involve
high resource commitments and aﬀect the organization’s overall scope
and direction (Sternad 2011).
Changing environments can pose constraints as well as create oppor-
tunities for organizations (Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985), so do major eco-
nomic crises (Wan and Yiu 2009). Weick (1995), however, voiced an im-
portant caveat not to fall victim of, as he called it, an ‘innocent-sounding
phrase,’ as ‘the’ in ‘the environment’ could imply that there is one sin-
gular reality which can be measured objectively, which he literally calls
a ‘nonsense’ (Weick 1995). Weick’s argument is that an environment is
only disclosed to actors within an organization through the process of
sense-making. The sense-making aspect is also pointed out by Haeckel
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(1999, 75) when he states that ‘[e]very adaptive system [. . .] survives by
making sense out of its environment and responding with appropriate
action.’
Economic crises are environments which are both uncertain and com-
plex, and in which individuals’ limited cognitive abilities and processing
capacities make a full understanding of all involved factors and the re-
lationship between them virtually impossible (Tung 1979; Frishammar
2006). Thus, one and the same external event can be perceived diﬀerently
by diﬀerent managers. As, according to upper echelons theory, execu-
tives’ cognitions and perceptions can have an influence on their strate-
gic decision-making tendencies (Hambrick andMason 1984), it becomes
crucial to take managerial perceptions and interpretations of environ-
mental events into account when investigating how organizations strate-
gically adapt to economic crises.
Possible Cultural Influences on Strategic Adaptation Behaviour
According to cultural immersion theory, perceptions, interpretations,
and responses to environmental stimuli are influenced by the culture in
which people live significant parts of their life through subconsciously
developed ‘shared schemas’ (Dickson, BeShears, and Gupta 2004). Some
definitions of culture specifically embed the role that this concept plays
in interpreting the environment (Schein 1984; Trompenaars 1996; Hoﬀ-
man 2007). Geletkanycz (1997, 617), for example sees national culture as
‘a common frame of reference or logic by which members of a society
view organizations, the environment, and their relations to one another’
(italics added by the author of this article).
The proposition that national cultural diﬀerences influence on strat-
egy is supported by Gilbert and Lorange (1994) and Schneider and Bar-
soux (1997). Conceptual papers on the issue were provided by Brock,
Barry, and Thomas (2000), and Schneider (1989); the latter assuming
that culture is playing a role in the way in which strategic issues are
interpreted and priorities are established. Brockner (2003) also identi-
fied an influence of national culture on decision-making tendencies. Al-
though Samiee and Athanassiou (1998) were of the opinion that the ef-
fect of culture on strategic decision-making processes had not yet been
widely investigated, also a range of empirical studies exist (for exam-
ple Kagono et al. 1985; Sallivan and Nonaka 1988; Haiss 1990; Hegarty
and Hoﬀman 1990; Schneider and DeMeyer 1991; Kotha, Dunbar, and
Birs 1995; Hitt et al. 1997; Geletkanycz 1997; Hennart and Larimo 1998;
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Steensma, Marino, and Weaver 2000; Markóczy 2000; Parnell 2004; Barr
and Glynn 2004; Ayoun and Moreo 2008) about the asserted link be-
tween culture and strategy, however as yet yielding ambiguous results.
Some authors (like for instance Markóczy 2000 or Hoﬀman 2007) did
not find a link at all, leading Markóczy (2000) to pose the question
whether cultural diﬀerences are actually overrated. Those, who found
cultural influences on strategic decision-making processes, were usually
focusing either on strategic decision contents (examples include Hitt et
al. (1997), who found that while us managers focused on discounted
cash-flow, roi, and projected demand, their Korean counterparts em-
phasized growth and expansion, or the recent work of Dimitratos et
al. (2011), who presented evidence that diﬀerences in national culture
can also aﬀect international strategic decisions of firms) or on cultural
influences on managers’ attitudes. Geletkanycz (1997), for instance, re-
vealed that the cultural dimensions of individualism, uncertainty avoid-
ance, power distance, and short-term orientation correlated with exec-
utives’ commitment to the status quo rather than advocating strategic
chance.
In this article, I attempt to combine these two perspectives – cultural
influences on strategy content as well as on managerial attitudes – by
proposing that strategic action can be influenced by culture in at least
two ways (see figure 1): First, directly, when decision-makers select be-
tween strategic alternatives based on their culturally-influenced personal
perceptions and basic assumptions, and second, indirectly, when culture
aﬀects how decision-makers interpret major trends and events in the en-
vironment (also termed ‘strategic issues’ by Ansoﬀ 1975), with this in-
terpretations in turn influencing strategic action. Following Mintzberg,
Raisinghani, and Théorêt (1976), the diagnosis of issues in large part de-
termines the subsequent choice of action. This is also supported by Dut-
ton and Jackson (1987) and is a general assumption of strategic issue di-
agnosis research (e. g. Daft and Weick 1984; Dutton, Fahey, and Narayan
1983; Julian and Ofori-Dankwa 2008; Plambeck and Weber 2010).
One of the dominant concepts in strategic issue diagnosis is the cat-
egorization of environmental developments as opportunities or threats.
Kovoor-Misra (2009) suggested that whether a crisis is perceived as an
opportunity or a threat has an eﬀect on the focus of attention of decision-
makers. Dutton and Jackson (1987) note that opportunity interpretations
include the perception of a situation as something positive over which
one has considerable control, while a situation that is seen as a threat is
Volume 10 · Number 3 · Fall 2012
262 Dietmar Sternad
Major
environmental
change
Strategic issue
interpretation
Decision
on strategic
response
Strategic
action
National culture
Indirect influence Direct influence
figure 1 Direct and indirect influence of national culture on strategic
adaptation decisions
usually associated with potentially negative consequences and little con-
trol over what is happening.
In this empirical study, it is examined whether an indirect influence
of cultural diﬀerences on strategic adaptation choices mediated through
opportunity/threat interpretations exists; and/or whether the diﬀerences
in cultural dimensions directly aﬀect the selection of strategic responses
to an economic crisis.
Strategic Responses to an Economic Crisis
Several authors have investigated the strategic actions firms are taking
when faced with situations of sudden economic downturn and recession.
From a review of the literature in this field, the following basic tendencies
emerge:
First, firms are using a wide range of strategic actions in response to
economic crises, the selection of which is also dependent on the type of
environment they are embedded in (Smart and Vertinsky 1984; Grewal
and Tansuhaj 2001). Strategies include rationalization or retrenchment
strategies on the one hand, as well as strategies of counter-cyclical pro-
tection or reinforcement of existing resource bases (Whittington 1991),
on the other hand, with cost-cutting and retrenchment being very com-
mon in times of recession (Bigelow and Chan 1992; Geroski and Gregg
1994; 1997; DeDee and Vorhies 1998; Michael and Robbins 1998). On an-
other dimension, some strategies are internally-directed (like reinforc-
ing control systems or improvement of business processes), while oth-
ers are externally-directed towards the market – including for instance
changes in marketing strategies (Shama 1993), changes in pricing strate-
gies (Chou and Chen 2004), or changes in the international orientation
of the firm (Lee et al. 2009; Enderwick 2009; Williamson and Zeng 2009;
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Schuh 2011). Recent research (Latham and Braun 2010; Sternad 2011) also
showed a tendency towards focussing on customer retention in times of
crisis. Merely financial strategies were identified as being the least eﬀec-
tive responses to economic downturn in a study by Laitinen (2000).
Second, strategies employed in times of recession impact on both
short-term company performance as well as long-term performance in
recovery (Whittington 1991). It was found that an over-reliance on re-
trenchment strategies can result in negative long-term eﬀects (DeDee
and Vorhies 1998), while counter-cyclical investment strategies can po-
tentially lead to higher performance during recovery (Whittington 1991;
Roberts 2003; Wan and Yiu 2009). Already Edith Penrose (1995, 244) in
her classic work The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, first published in
1959, found that ‘depression is sometimes looked on as a good time to
expand: costs are low, plant can be constructed and equipment bought
cheaply.’
Third, it was proposed by several authors (e. g. Chastain 1982; Laiti-
nen 2000; Pearce and Michael, 2006; Kitching et al. 2009; Rhodes and
Stelter 2009) that a balanced (or ‘ambidextrous’ in the words of Kitching
et al. 2009) approach covering both short-term eﬃciency improvements
and selective market-oriented investments can lead to a higher chance of
success both during as well as after the crisis.
I propose a two-dimensional matrix to classify possible strategic ac-
tions in response to an economic crisis. The first dimension is based on
Chattopadhyay, Glick, andHuber’s (2001) distinction between externally-
directed action (strategic action that is directed towards the market) and
internally-directed action (action that is directed towards changing the
structure, processes, systems, or resource use within the organization).
The second dimension distinguishes between pro-active strategies (in-
cluding counter-cyclical investments) and retrenchment strategies. This
dimension resembles a similar conceptualization for the classification
of recession strategies put forward by Whittington (1991, 15), who used
the terms ‘counter-cyclical hoarders’ and ‘recessionary rationalisers.’ The
resulting four types of strategies in response to economic crises – pro-
active/external, pro-active/internal, retrenchment/external and retrench-
ment/internal – are not mutually exclusive. They can, as was pointed
out above, be used in combination in ‘ambidextrous’ strategies. Fig-
ure 2 provides examples for strategic actions that can be placed into the
four quadrants of strategic adaptation strategies in response to economic
crises.
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Withdrawing from markets
Divestment of products/product lines
Rationalization in sales
Rationalization in marketing
Selling parts of the business
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Rationalization in administration
Rationalization in technology
Rationalization in hr
Rationalization in r&d
Rationalization in production
Rationalization in logistics
figure 2 Classification of Strategies in Response to Economic Crises
Hypotheses on the Link between the Cultural Dimension of
Uncertainty Avoidance and Strategic Adaptation Processes
In Schneider and De Meyer’s (1991) study, national culture was found
to have an eﬀect on both external and internal strategic responses to
environmental change. Several researchers and research teams have
proposed ‘cultural dimensions,’ constructs aiming at reducing cultural
complexities and measuring national cultural diﬀerences between so-
cieties. Among the best-known studies in this field are Hall’s (1960;
1976), Trompenaars and Hamden-Turner’s (1998), Hofstede’s (1980), and
House et al.’s (2004) globe study.
One cultural dimension – uncertainty avoidance – which can be
found in both Hofstede’s as well as House et al.’s study, lends itself
well for studying possible cultural eﬀects on managerial thinking and
actions in economic crises, as they are by their nature times of uncer-
tainty. For firms, which are faced with an economic downturn, it is
hard to predict how long the crisis will last, and how deep it will be-
come. While the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance was asso-
ciated with stress measures such as nervousness and tenseness at work
in Hofstede’s work (Venaik and Brewer 2010), the construct was more
focused on aspects like valuing rules, order, and predictability in the
globe study (Sully de Luque and Javidan 2004). Uncertainty avoid-
ance was also found to be related to managerial resistance to change
(Geletkanycz 1997) and to the propensity to take risks (Bontempo, Bot-
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tom, and Weber 1997), with the degree of risk in turn being a major
criterion in decisions of how to strategically react to a crisis. Sully de
Luque and Javidan (2004, 618), for instance, see the tendency in societies
with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance to ‘[t]ake more moderate
calculated risks.’ Pro-active strategies in times of economic downturn
carry a considerable amount of risk due to an uncertain future, while
retrenchment strategies can be seen as a more ‘secure’ path on known
ground. They are more likely to yield short-term eﬀects and carry a
lower risk regarding the expected outcomes. Therefore, I hypothesize
that managers in cultures with a higher degree of uncertainty avoid-
ance are more inclined to use retrenchment strategies (both internal and
external):
hypothesis 1a Internal retrenchment crisis adaptation strategies will
be more common in cultures with a higher degree of uncertainty avoid-
ance.
hypothesis 1b External retrenchment crisis adaptation strategies will
be more common in cultures with a higher degree of uncertainty avoid-
ance.
In contrast to the hypotheses above, which are asserting a direct rela-
tionship between the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance and
managers’ propensity to choose certain categories of adaptive strategies,
it is explored in the following whether an indirect link exists between
uncertainty avoidance and the choice of strategic action, with strategic
issue interpretation as opportunity or threat as a mediating variable. If
radical changes – especially negative ones with uncertain outcomes – are
likely to be seen as a threat in cultures which are valuing predictability,
are risk-averse, and less in favour of changes, then we can assume that
higher levels of uncertainty avoidance in a culture could foster the in-
terpretation of a major negative environmental change such as a global
economic crisis (in which risk and uncertainty are inherent) as a threat.
Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) found that the interpretation of
events and developments as a threat tend to be associated with more de-
fensive responses. Therefore, I suggest that threat interpretations medi-
ate a relationship between the level of uncertainty avoidance in a society
and defensive retrenchment strategies (both externally and internally-
directed):
hypothesis 2a The degree to which internal retrenchment strategies
are used in response to an economic crisis is positively influenced by the
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level of uncertainty avoidance in a culture, mediated through threat
interpretation.
hypothesis 2b The degree to which external retrenchment strategies
are used in response to an economic crisis is positively influenced by the
level of uncertainty avoidance in a culture, mediated through threat
interpretation.
Method
sample and data collection
The hypotheses were tested in a quantitative study among managers in
Austria and Slovenia, two European nations which were chosen for the
reasons (a) that they are likely to exhibit both common cultural char-
acteristics (due to their centuries of common history under Habsburg
rule) as well as cultural diﬀerences (due to their aﬃliation with two ma-
jor European cultural areas – the Slavic and Germanic languages regions,
and due to the decades of communist influence in Slovenia before 1991),
(b) that they share comparable institutional environments (both are eu
member states), and (c) that the 2008–2009 financial crisis had a similar
impact on the countries in terms of time and magnitude.
After a qualitative pre-study including semi-structured interviews
with Austrian and Slovene top managers, I conducted a quantitative
study in September 2010 in which a link to an online questionnaire was
distributed via e-mail to managing directors of Austrian and Slovene
companies in three industries that were particularly aﬀected by the
2008–2009 financial and economic crisis in both countries: printing,
construction of machinery, and travel agencies. The Compnet (Austria)
and pirs (Slovenia) business databases were used for the contact ad-
dresses of all companies in these industries except one-person firms. The
procedure followed the multiple-contact method suggested by Dillman
(2007). Representatives of 346 out of all 1,667 contacted companies re-
sponded, yielding an overall gross response rate of 20.8%. I excluded
respondents who were (a) in their positions for less than two years, (b)
not of Austrian or Slovene nationality, (c) working for foreign compa-
nies (local subsidiaries of foreign companies remained included), or (d)
not suﬃciently filling out the questionnaire. 257 of the questionnaires
were valid and usable for further analysis (157 from Austria, 100 from
Slovenia).
Various steps were taken to minimize the risk of bias in the re-
search: In line with other cross-cultural studies (Shane, Venkatraman,
Managing Global Transitions
Adaptive Strategies in Response to the Economic Crisis 267
and MacMillan 1995; Geletkanycz 1997), back-translation procedures
were employed to minimize translation problems. Following Huber and
Power (1985), the following steps were taken to minimize the influence
of retrospective report bias: (1) using the most appropriate persons as in-
formants. As members of the management board or managing directors
are likely to be the most knowledgeable persons on strategic issues, they
were directly targeted with the research; (2) taking away the fear that the
research could have possible adverse eﬀects on the respondents’ interests
through ensuring full anonymity to the participatingmanagers; (3) using
scales that were pre-tested in prior research (in the case of strategic issue
analysis). To mitigate the risk of non-response bias, mean responses of
the first quartile were compared with the fourth quartile of respondents
for each variable, as is has been found that late respondents often react
similarly to non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977; Ghobadian
et al. 2008). The absence of significant diﬀerences signals a low threat
of non-response bias. No single factor emerged in an unrotated factor
analysis, thus suggesting that common method bias is also not a major
concern (Podsakoﬀ and Organ 1986).
measures
Considerable eﬀort was put into the design of the survey instrument,
which was developed in a three-step process. First, literature was re-
viewed for existing and tested constructs that represent the key issues and
concepts. Second, the initial instrument was reviewed by five manage-
ment researchers for content validity regarding the concepts that it ought
to measure. Third, as conducting qualitative interviews with members of
the target population is seen as vital to ensure content validity for the de-
velopment of a scale which is used in quantitative research (Johnson and
Harris 2003), managing directors of six companies in Austria and Slove-
nia were interviewed to check face validity, clarity, and meaningfulness
of the questions, thus pre-testing both the relevance of the questions and
the clarity and comprehensiveness of the questionnaire, while at the same
time trying to minimize cross-cultural equivalence bias (Fontaine 2008).
The instrument was subsequently modified with minor changes accord-
ing to the additional input gained from both management researchers
and practicing managers.
strategic issue diagnosis
The opportunity and threat constructs were measured with items which
were slightly adapted from those proposed by Julian and Ofori-Dankwa
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(2008), and included the aspects of potential gain, positiveness, and con-
trollability for opportunity, and possible negative implications and po-
tential reduction in profits for threat. An item measuring limited con-
trollability was included for in the questionnaire, but had to be excluded
in the subsequent analysis due to reliability concerns. Based on the rec-
ommendation of Hinkin (1998), all strategic issue diagnosis items were
measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale. The scores for each construct
were calculated as an average of the item scores that together constitute
the construct. Cronbach’s alpha for the resulting three-item opportunity
construct was 0.776, and 0.822 for the two-item threat construct.
strategic action
Following two dimensions proposed by Chattopadhyay, Glick and Hu-
ber (2001) and Whittington (1991), and incorporating diﬀerent strate-
gic adaptation measures in response to crises identified by Whitting-
ton (1991), Geroski and Gregg (1997), DeDee and Vorhies (1998), Laiti-
nen (2000), and Roberts (2003), four categories of strategic action in
response to the crisis were measured as follows: (1) Pro-active/external
strategies included items on the extent of investment into new markets
and diversification of the business, on the importance of customer acqui-
sition and customer retention strategies (measured on a 5-point Likert-
type scale with the anchors 1 = ‘not used at all’ and 5 = ‘highly used’), and
on the extent of investment into sales and marketing (both measured on
a bipolar scale from ‘strong rationalization’ to ‘strong investment,’ with
the answers subsequently transposed as follows: ‘strong rationalization,’
‘some rationalization’ and ‘no changes’ into 1, ‘some investment’ into 3
and ‘strong investment’ into 5 on a scale of 1–5. The resulting 6-item vari-
able ‘Pro-active/external’ was calculated as the average of the individual
item scores, with all items carrying the same weight. Cronbach’s alpha
of this construct was measured as 0.746. The other three categories were
measured using the same logic: (2) Retrenchment/external strategies in-
cluded items on the extent of using the following strategies: withdrawing
from markets, divestment of product/product lines, selling parts of the
business, focus on the core business (5-point Likert-type scale), rational-
ization in sales, and rationalization in marketing (bipolar scales trans-
posed to ‘strong investment,’ ‘some investment,’ ‘no changes’ = 1, ‘some
rationalization’ = 3, ‘strong rationalization’ = 5). Reliability for the 6-item
construct was measured at α = 0.658. (3) Pro-active/internal strategies
consisted of six items on investment into technology, quality, hr, r&d,
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production, and logistics (each measured on a bipolar scale transposed
as in (1) above) with an α = 0.725. (4) Retrenchment/internal strategies
were measured with items on the extent of rationalization in the areas
of administration, technology, hr, r&d, production, and logistics (each
measured on a bipolar scale transposed as in (2) above). Reliability was
measured at α = 0.708.
differences in uncertainty avoidance
In line with prior cross-cultural studies (Geletkanycz 1997; Barr and
Glynn 2004), national cultural values were not explicitly surveyed but
assigned to respondents from a widely recognized study, thus also re-
ducing the risk of common method bias. Due to the sample (managers),
relative recency, research method (quantitative study), and contents (fre-
quently used cultural dimensions), the findings on cultural practices
of the globe study (House et al. 2004) were used to determine diﬀer-
ences in the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance between Aus-
tria and Slovenia. On the 1 (low) to 7 (high) globe scale, Austria showed
a higher level of uncertainty avoidance (5.17; first quartile of countries)
than Slovenia (3.78, third quartile) (House et al. 2004). Following Peng,
Peterson and Shy’s (1991) advice, the diﬀerences between the two coun-
tries on the globe scores were dichotomized into ‘high’ versus ‘low,’ as
the ordinal nature of responses is more dependable than their interval
aspects.
control variables
Control variables included company size (as for example Peters 1992;
Chen and Hambrick 1995; Dean, Brown and Bamford 1998; and Latham
2009 found size-specific diﬀerences in strategic adaptation to environ-
mental change), industry (as according to Spender (1989) firms within
one sector often use ‘industry recipes’ in response to environmental
change), the availability of slack resources (using the two-item self-
report scale developed by Chattopadhyay, Glick and Huber 2001), and
respondents’ gender and age group.
Results
87.5% of the respondents were owners, board members or managing
directors of their companies. Firm sizes ranged from 1–50 employees
(66.5%), 51–250 employees (21.8%), 251–500 employees (7.0%) to more
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than 500 employees (4.7%). 81.1% of respondents were male, 18.9% fe-
male.
Descriptive statistics on strategic action in response to economic cri-
sis, strategic issue diagnosis, and on key control variables are presented
in table 1. Significant correlations between the individual strategic choice
categories could be determined. The two pro-active strategies (external
and internal) positively correlate with each other, as do the two retrench-
ment strategies. On the other hand, as one would also intuitively assume,
all pro-active and retrenchment strategies are negatively correlated with
each other. Furthermore, the results suggest that interpretations of the
crisis as an opportunity is significantly related to the use of pro-active
strategies, and that threat perception is linked to the extent that inter-
nal retrenchment strategies are used. The use of three strategies (pro-
active external, pro-active internal, and retrenchment-external) as well
as threat perception significantly correlate with country diﬀerences in
the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance.
Descriptive statistics on country level are presented in table 2 together
with the results of first tests of country diﬀerences without taking into
account any of the control variables. Both t-tests and non-parametric
Mann-Whitney-U-tests show the same results: Significant country dif-
ferences were found in the use of external and internal pro-active strate-
gies (both were more common in Slovenia) and of external retrench-
ment strategies (more common in Austria), as well as in the perception
of the crisis as a threat (higher in Slovenia). No country-specific diﬀer-
ences could be determined for opportunity perceptions and for the use
of internal retrenchment strategies. Overall, we can see that external pro-
active strategies were by far the most frequently used strategic response
to the economic crisis in both countries.
Hierarchical multiple regression with external and internal retrench-
ment strategies in response to the crisis as the dependent variables were
used to control for possible eﬀects in company size, industry diﬀerences
(dummy-coded), availability of slack, and gender and age of respondents
(see table 3 for the detailed results). Possible mediating eﬀects were tested
using the three regression equations as suggested by Baron and Kenny
(1986).
The results show a link between the perception of the crisis as a threat
and the use of internal retrenchment strategies. However, there is no sig-
nificant influence of the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance on
the use of internal retrenchment strategies. Hypothesis 1a was, therefore,
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not substantiated. With one of the conditions for a mediating eﬀect also
not being fulfilled, also Hypothesis 2a needed to be rejected. In the case
of external retrenchment strategies, diﬀerences in uncertainty avoidance
levels had an eﬀect. As external retrenchment strategies were significantly
more frequently reported in Austria even after all control variables were
entered into the model, h1b received support. Testing for a possible me-
diating eﬀect of threat perception between uncertainty avoidance and ex-
ternal retrenchment strategies using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three re-
gression equations, however, failed on one condition, as the eﬀect of the
independent variable (country diﬀerences) on the dependent one (ex-
ternal retrenchment strategies) was higher in the equation in which the
presumed mediator threat perception was controlled (not standardized
coeﬃcient = 0.281, p < 0.01) than in the equation without this strategic
issue diagnosis variable (not standardized coeﬃcient = 0.229, p < 0.01).
Therefore, hypothesis 2b could not be substantiated – threat perception
does not mediate the relationship between national diﬀerences and the
use of external retrenchment strategies.
Discussion and Conclusions
The findings of the empirical study are ambiguous as to whether diﬀer-
ences in the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance influence on
the strategic decision-making process when firms adapt to an economic
crisis situation. It was hypothesized that in cultures with higher uncer-
tainty avoidance, managers tend to use more retrenchment strategies,
both internal as well as external ones. While in one category, external
retrenchment strategies, a potential significant influence of the uncer-
tainty avoidance variable was found, such a relationship could not be
determined for internal retrenchment strategies. Therefore, diﬀerences
in uncertainty avoidance did not provide a consistent explanation of dif-
ferences in the choice of strategic action in response to the economic
crisis.
The results add to the inconclusive discussion in which some studies
(e. g. Geletkanycz 1997; Hitt et al. 1997; Barr and Glynn 2004) confirm the
existence of cultural influences on strategic decision-making processes,
while others (e. g. Markóczy 2000; Hoﬀman 2007) did not find signifi-
cant variations in strategy-related beliefs and practices of managers be-
tween cultures. The findings of this study seem to support the latter
group, thus also confirming the results of Ayoun and Moreoe’s (2008)
work in which cross-cultural diﬀerences in uncertainty avoidance levels
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also only had minimal influence on managers’ strategic orientations. A
possible explanation can be found in the possibility that country-specific
diﬀerences that do aﬀect strategic choice are a complex combination of
diﬀerent factors such as culture, institutional framework, business cli-
mate, or public opinion. The diﬃculty to disentangle cultural factors
from institutional influences and economic systems was also acknowl-
edged by Schneider (1989).
Reducing country diﬀerences to cultural diﬀerences, and in particular
also to one specific cultural dimension, without considering other insti-
tutional or social factors is also one of the major limitations of this study.
Further limitations include the two-country instead of a multi-country
study design, and the selection of countries for the sample from the same
region – Central Europe. Ethnocentric bias (Adler 1983) could be a pos-
sible issue as the author is a citizen of one of the two observed countries.
A cross-cultural research team would be preferable. Another limitation
lies in the retrospective questions that were asked after the crisis situation
occurred, thus being susceptible to hindsight bias – the tendency to rec-
ollect one’s own interpretations as more ‘correct’ after the event (Wright
et al. 2004) and to attributional bias – attributing outcomes to salient,
however incorrect causes (Huber and Power 1985). Only industries on
which the crisis had a considerable negative influence were included in
the study. It is possible that diﬀerent strategic adaptation tendencies exist
in industries, which were less negatively or even positively aﬀected by the
economic downturn. Together with the high proportion of small firms
and male respondents as well as the fact that the sample only included
firms that survived the economic crisis, this limits the possibility to gen-
eralize the results to the whole population of firms.
The limitations of this study present opportunities for further re-
search: Follow-up studies could include a larger set of countries. To-
gether with a selection of culturallymore distant countries, also from dif-
ferent continents, this could yield more pronounced results. Other forms
of research – particularly also qualitative one – that observe strategic re-
actions in real-time as opposed to retrospective might alleviate problems
of potential hindsight bias and attributional bias. As the sole use of cul-
tural diﬀerences achieved insuﬃcient explanatory power, further studies
could add other country-specific factors to their design, such as institu-
tional diﬀerences, short-term public opinion, business climate, or more
generally, as Tsui, Nifadkar and Yi Ou (2007) suggest, the political, social,
and economic context. Further cross-cultural studies on strategic adap-
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tation could attend to other major environmental changes in addition
to economic crises, such as technological discontinuities or changes in
the institutional environment, thereby also extending our knowledge on
whether diﬀerent types of environmental change trigger diﬀerent strate-
gic responses.
Other research opportunities emerge from one major counter-intuiti-
ve result of this study, the high level of external pro-active strategies,
which were used in both countries, Austria and Slovenia, in response
to the crisis compared to retrenchment strategies. Companies focused
more on customer acquisition and retention, as well as on creating new
market opportunities than they did on rationalization. Recent research
results from other regions also support this general tendency. Battisti
and Deakins (2010) in their study of firms in New Zealand, for example,
observed that market-oriented strategies led to better performance in
the recession than cost-cutting. In their work on Chinese manufacturing
smes, Naidoo (2010) showed that marketing innovations as an exem-
plary pro-active strategy are instrumental to building competitive ad-
vantages that increase the likelihood of firm survival during an economic
crisis. These results, combined with recent theoretical advantages on how
firms can capitalize on opportunities created by a changing environment
(Wan and Yiu 2009) could lead to a research agenda in which diﬀerent
pro-active crisis response strategies and their eﬀects on firm performance
are investigated in more detail, thus adding to our understanding how
these strategies can also improve firm performance in prima facie adverse
environmental
conditions.
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